

South Carolina's Jocassee Gorges— Private Vice or Public Virtue?

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Introduction

In 1997, the state of South Carolina acquired from Duke Energy Corporation 33,000 acres of undeveloped land in western South Carolina known as the Jocassee Gorges. The \$54 million property, which the state obtained through a combination of purchase, gifts, and tax credits, is part of the Blue Ridge Escarpment in the southern Appalachian mountains, an area known for abundant rainfall, spectacular waterfalls, biodiversity, and lack of commercial development (see Figure 1). The land had been the private property of Duke Energy (previously, Duke Power) for years; the firm began acquiring the property in the early 1900s for hydroelectric generation purposes and in recent years had made the private land available to hunters, campers, hikers, naturalists, and other outdoor enthusiasts.

State acquisition of the Jocassee Gorges was celebrated in many circles. To the relief of environmentalists and others who wanted to preserve the property in as natural a state as possible, the transfer allayed the threat of development. What had been private property managed by a for-profit corporation was now public property to be managed by stewards of state-owned natural resource assets. Property rights and incentives had changed.


On February 3, 2002, however, less than five years after the transition from private to public property, the South Carolina Sierra Club included the Jocassee Gorges in its list of “special places”—a list that highlights beautiful but threatened lands. What was the problem? Sierra Club Executive Director Dell Isham explained: “It [the Jocassee Gorges] may be public property, but it is still threatened because of the poor management of the Department of Natural Resources” (Davis 2002, 3B).

Apparently, state ownership has not preserved the property as expected, nor has it brought satisfaction to all constituents with an interest in it. Property rights and management incentives have a great deal to do with this unhappy outcome. We propose now to explain why.

In this case study, we take a close look at the property rights history of the Jocassee Gorges. We contrast Duke Energy’s management of the property with the state’s management objective and consider evidence on the realities of state

ownership. Finally, we offer some thoughts on how the transfer might have been structured—and could still be—to avoid some of the resource management problems that emerged. But because a change in property rights is so critical to the Jocassee Gorges story, we must first review some property rights concepts.

Figure 1
Jocassee Gorges Map



Property Rights and Incentives

The property rights associated with any particular natural resource are the result of a dynamic process. Property rights change over time, as a resource becomes more or less scarce and as the cost of defining and monitoring property rights changes (Anderson and Hill 1977; Leal 1996; Libecap 1994; Ostrom 1990). When the property rights history of a given natural resource or place is examined closely, several stages are often discovered. Initially, there are no enforced rights of ownership or use. The resource is a commons; its use is rationed by first come, first served. Then, when demand for use increases and management of the resource yields a payoff, rights become defined by members of a tribe or community. The resource becomes common property. At another time, the property status may be public, with a governmental unit holding and managing rights to the resource. In other settings, specific rights to the resource are privately owned and held, but an overlay of government regulation, which can be thought of as regulatory property rights, can affect those rights (Wiener 1999).

These property rights categories are defined partly by the voice or voices that

determine use. When property is held in common, members of the community determine use. This can be accomplished by custom, tradition, or by voting (Ostrom 1990), perhaps by a family or tribal council (Leal 1996, 3–4).

Public property involves a political unit. Unlike common property, it is managed by officials holding delegated authority given to them by politicians, who may be in turn elected by the body politic. Those holding delegated authority regulate use. The layers of authority that lie between individual citizen-owners and delegated managers raise the costs of monitoring usage, making it more costly for particular groups to affect outcomes.

Private property regulated by the state is another category. These regulatory property rights represent a political voice in addition to that of the private owner, as government restrictions attenuate the private rights that form the full bundle of rights. For example, in the United States, the right to locate a septic tank on private land is often not determined by the owner of the land but rather by the political units that regulate that condition of land use. The ability to operate an electric power plant, which is private property, is constrained by air quality regulations, which define how the power plant will be built and what technologies will be used in generating electricity.

Finally, of course, we can envision an all-inclusive bundle of private property rights to a resource that gives the owner, who has complete voice in the matter, full sway in determining how the property will be used, who will use it, and how it might be transferred to others. But this is rare.


Economists generally accept the proposition that when resource rights are privately held, the property will be managed to maximize its value to owners; costs will be minimized and appropriate risks and investments will be undertaken to enhance its use and value. Because value is determined by those who use the resource, including the owner, higher value implies that the resource is providing greater benefits to the users. Economists view an expansion of social benefits to be a desirable outcome

Private property rights provide incentives that yield social benefits. The fundamental reason is that the owner bears the costs of errors and gains the rewards of stewardship. Private owners, whether individuals or firms, have a long-run perspective. In the case of a profit-maximizing firm, the value of the firm's assets—its transferable shares—reflects the discounted present value of future earnings. In other words, the shares' value today depends on returns expected in the future. This is why ownership spurs timber owners to routinely follow a 40-year or similar time horizon in managing their tree planting and harvesting. The value of their stock today reflects the value of the future timber. A long-term horizon, of course, assumes that the rights in question are protected.

Visiting the Property Rights Stations

These property rights notions can be visualized as stations on the property rights continuum shown in Figure 2. The arrows indicating the flows between property rights stations are gross simplifications of an extraordinarily subtle process.

Figure 2
Property Rights Status



Starting with a commons, consider movement through the property rights stations. Suppose a tribe or community of people determine that the value of a commons cannot be maintained unless use is rationed. Common property may be the low-cost way to accomplish this. If so, any member of the community will have limited access, and social, tribal, and family pressures enforce the community agreement. As residual claimants, these members stand to gain from an efficient system for allocating rights. If such informal arrangements for rationing use fail to protect the resource, then the community may form a governmental unit to manage the asset, granting members of the government power to coerce other community members.

The sketch does not imply any single sequence. Rights to resources that were public can become private, as when a government closes military bases and auctions land rights to private parties. Rights once privately defined and enforced can become public property, as when Duke Energy sold land to the state of South Carolina. And resources that were once held privately can become a commons. The arrival of Europeans in the Pacific Northwest disrupted a communal property rights system that Native Americans had established for managing salmon fisheries (Higgs 1982). As a result of conquest, carefully managed rights to the fishery were destroyed; the fishery became a commons and then public property.

In Figure 2, we attempt to capture some of the transition possibilities by using

double-pointed arrows to indicate the reversibility of property rights status. The decision point at the bottom of the chart indicates that private property rights can be defined as fee simple or as regulatory rights specified by the state (Wiener 1999).

One way to visualize the change in property rights stations is to see them as shifts toward or away from open or closed decision-making (Holderness 1985). Exclusive private property rights imply a closed system, because the right holder has unilateral power to exclude unwanted users. (This does not mean that holders of private property rights have the right to impose costs on others against their will.) At the other end of the spectrum, a commons has no defined right holders. The system is completely open, and allocation is by the law of capture. Anyone who joins the group has voice, and, presumably, use of the resource in question. All else equal, transaction costs rise with increases in membership and voice.

When Property Is Public

The shift of ownership of the Jocassee Gorges from private to public ownership is the chief topic of this paper. There is reason to expect that, due to incentives, public ownership will not maintain or enhance the environmental quality of the resource. The record of governmental agencies as stewards of environmental resources is not compelling. Examples of particularly egregious policies are losses from the management of national forests by the U.S. Forest Service, subsidies to the Bureau of Reclamation to irrigate arid lands for agriculture, and subsidies to farmers to drain wetlands to expand crop acreage.¹ These policies foster specialized bureaucracies and bring political gain to their legislative supporters, but are at odds with the role of government as environmental caretaker.

There are numerous reasons behind such examples. Economists who have examined public sector behavior through the lens of public choice argue that political decision making is no less subject to the “profit motive” than private decision making, but because of differing property rights incentives, public ownership leads to different results. For example, Niskanen (1971, 1996) argues that government bureaucrats seek to maximize their discretionary budgets; larger budgets may give them more clout with constituents, greater job security, and a lighter workload, and the size of discretionary budget also may allow government agents to pursue their own goals. Along these lines, Lindsay (1976) hypothesizes that bureaucrats will maximize the production of outputs that are easily observed and reduce outputs (and their accompanying costs) that are difficult to monitor. Of course, it is only under the most extreme circumstances that government employees bear the cost of resource mismanagement.

Because government managers are released from concern with profits as they are traditionally described, they may resist the pressure to develop a natural

resource that a profit-maximizing resource owner would find costly to reject. This might at first blush seem to be environmentally sound, but public sector managers still face constraints and respond to incentives. Because it is costly for the average person to monitor government, public agents may “do it their way,” instead of following precisely the preference of the people. For similar reasons, it is possible that public sector managers will allow an asset to deteriorate, because they are rarely penalized personally when that happens.

In addition, a highly publicized redefinition of property rights from private to public can increase demand for resource access and use, which in turn can increase the cost of property rights enforcement and lead to deterioration of the resource. And once the property has become publicly owned, normal economic behavior by public sector rights holders can bring about undesirable outcomes for members of interest groups that join an effort to redefine rights.²

In this paper we will examine how these forces played out when the property rights to the Jocassee Gorges became public.

History of the Jocassee Gorges

The history of the Jocassee Gorges reveals a number of property rights transitions. It was private property when held by Duke Energy. Many years before that it was part of the tribal lands of the Cherokee Indians, and it is now public property.

The Early Years

The area has a rich Cherokee Indian history and heritage as illustrated by local geographical names. The word “Jocassee” means “place of the lost one,” and refers to a Cherokee maiden in Indian folklore.³ Hernando de Soto explored the area in 1539. This and later contact infected the Cherokee population with disease; yet despite periodic epidemics, trade between whites and Cherokees was robust during the 1700s. Conflicts, however, were frequent, and frontier attacks and war were often the result (e.g., Cherokee War of 1760–61). Following these hostilities, the Cherokee were forced to relinquish all lands in South Carolina, except for a strip in the northwest corner of the state that was sold in 1816. By 1790, 16,000 new residents had moved onto what had been Cherokee lands. The communal and private property of the Cherokees was transferred to the European settlers.

These settlers were primarily Scottish and Irish, and their small farms dotted the river valleys. Migration from these lands to textile towns began in the early 1900s, and timber companies moved in to buy large tracts of the land, often for payment of back taxes left on the books by the settlers. With the exception of

small, inaccessible pockets, the old-growth forests were cut by World War I, and the land has been managed intensively for forest products since that time. The land changed ownership many times, with one of the most notable owners being Singer Sewing Machine Company, which managed most of the property from 1936 until 1963, when the land was sold to Duke Power.

Under Duke Power

Duke Power purchased land in the Jocassee Gorges in 1913 and 1915. These purchases, along with many others in the western Carolinas, were along river valleys and were made with the intent of generating hydroelectric power. Duke's holdings increased in the 1940s, and in 1963 Duke purchased 83,400 acres, primarily from the Singer Corporation, but also from private landowners. Before that purchase, in 1939, Duke created a forestry department (later Crescent Resources, Incorporated) to manage its lands for timber production and to control erosion and sedimentation of reservoirs.

Unique geographical features provide the hydroelectric potential that attracted Duke Power to the Jocassee Gorges. The area receives 75 inches of rain per year, more than any other place east of the Mississippi, contains six major river gorges, and is characterized by steep terrain. The abundant rainfall and sharp changes in elevation result in spectacular waterfalls. In addition, the area is home to a number of rare plants and animals, including "more than 171 rare, threatened or endangered plant and animal species," according to the Jocassee Gorges Resource Management Plan (Rankin 1998, 4). The property's 33,000 acres are in the middle of a larger 150,000-acre holding known as the Blue Ridge Escarpment or "Blue Wall."

Through the years, the company's management of the property was sensitive to public and environmental concerns, leading to numerous awards for stewardship. On the Jocassee Gorges property, these efforts included heeding advice from wildlife and fisheries biologists, stocking deer and wild turkey, improving stream habitat for trout, and placing this property in the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Game Management Area (now Wildlife Management Area or WMA).⁴ Essentially, the land was managed for timber production, while free access was given to hunters and fishers.

Duke began ambitious development in the area in 1967 with construction of the Keowee-Toxaway project. This encompassed 116,000 acres and included the creation of two lakes, the 18,400-acre Keowee and the 7,500-acre Jocassee. Duke constructed a nuclear power plant on Lake Keowee and a pump-storage facility on Lake Jocassee; these became operational in 1973 and 1991 respectively. During construction of the pump-storage facility, Duke also built an 80-mile hiking trail, the Foothills Trail.

Beginning in 1995, South Carolina and North Carolina were given the

opportunity to purchase 43,000 acres of property in and around the Jocassee Gorges, at fair market value, until 1999. After that, if the states did not purchase the property, it would be sold for resort development. Each state accepted the offer. The appraised value of the South Carolina acreage (33,000 acres) was \$54.8 million, which was financed through a \$1 million purchase by the South Carolina Heritage Trust Fund (1,000 acres), a \$10 million-bond-financed purchase by the South Carolina General Assembly, a \$10 million contribution by the Conservation Fund of the Mellon Foundation, and a \$33.8 million gift from Duke Energy.⁵ Although Duke has sold most of the Jocassee Gorges property, it is developing residential property on Lake Keowee and retains 10,000 acres in the Jocassee Gorges for two additional pump-storage sites.

Duke Energy's motives for selling (and partly donating) the land to the state are a matter of speculation, but at least four explanations are plausible.

1. Duke Energy received many environmental awards, and turning the property over to the state is consistent with an interest in preserving land in an undeveloped state.
2. Leadership and direction may have changed with the retirement of its long-time board chairman and president in 1994.
3. Deregulation of the utility industry in the 1990s led to the expansion of Duke Energy through mergers and acquisitions, both domestic and abroad, so that its focus shifted from the western Carolinas.
4. Divestiture of a substantial portion of its holdings makes Duke less attractive for a hostile takeover and generates revenue to pursue mergers and acquisitions in the utility industry, its core business.

As noted, the Jocassee Gorges property has been intensively managed for forest products since the early 1900s, with Duke Energy continuing this use under its Crescent Resources subsidiary. Twenty-one percent of the property has been clear-cut, 51 percent has been selectively harvested, and 28 percent of the land has not been harvested because of inaccessibility or aesthetic value (Rankin 1998, 24).

Duke also made the land accessible to hunters and other outdoors users as a part of the Department of Natural Resources' Wildlife Management Area (WMA) program. Through this program, the State of South Carolina leases approximately one million acres of property from private (individual and corporate) and other government sources (e.g., U.S. Forest Service) for public hunting.⁶ Access to much of the property has been and continues to be controlled with gates and seasonal roads.

During the period of Duke's ownership, biologists employed by Duke and the state's Department of Natural Resources were included in management decisions, so that game species, threatened or endangered species, riparian zones, and delicate ecosystems received attention as well as forestry. The primary

recreational users were hunters, with hikers, fishers, and horseback riders, among others, also utilizing the property. Duke received many regional and national awards for its conservation achievements, including the highest award given by the National Wildlife Federation.

A New Era: State Ownership

Once the Jocassee Gorges property shifted from private to public ownership, new management was required. To develop a resource management plan, the state solicited and received input from public hearings, letters, and phone calls. A committee with representatives from the DNR, South Carolina Division of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, the South Carolina Forestry Commission, Duke Power Company, and Crescent Resources, Inc., formed the plan, which was then made public and is still subject to additional input. The plan is considered an organic document that will change over time.

As stated in the resource management plan, the primary objective is to “maintain the natural character of the area” through maintenance, restoration, and enhancement of “(s)ignificant plant, fish and wildlife communities.” Achieving this objective will entail preventing resort development and engaging in watershed management (especially for trout streams) and forest management (for game species) (Rankin 1998, 28). The plan’s secondary objective is “to provide outdoor recreation that is compatible with the area’s natural character.” Recreational opportunities listed include “fishing, hunting [the land’s WMA designation has been retained], hiking, [and] wildlife and scenery viewing.” Educational opportunities are also stressed (Rankin 1998, 29).

One goal of our research into the Jocassee Gorges was to determine what changes occurred as a result of the shift from private to public management. Given our knowledge of the problems that face public managers, we chose to focus on two major issues: changes in the use of the land and relationships among the interest groups that wanted to use the land.

Perhaps the most obvious factor affecting the use of the Jocassee Gorges after the resource was transferred to the state of South Carolina was the change in the public’s knowledge about the property. Even though Duke had allowed access for hunting and fishing during its period of ownership, the public’s awareness of the property was limited. But from the time Duke Energy offered the land to the state to the final sale—which culminated in a mountaintop-signing by then-governor David Beasley—the state’s media stayed abreast of the progress towards the property’s purchase. Thus, groups and individuals with an interest in the property were well-informed. As a past president of the South Carolina Sportsman’s Coalition said, “When the property went under public ownership, a whole lot of people found out about it.”⁷

A second and perhaps even more apparent factor that affected use of the property was the public's perception of access to state-owned property. Unlike private property, where people can be prosecuted for trespass, state ownership carries with it the understanding of joint consumption by all. Generally, the public does not expect to be excluded or required to pay for use.

Thus, we hypothesized that the combination of greater publicity and the shift from a closed to an open system led to 1) greater use of the property; 2) more abuse of the property (holding enforcement constant); and 3) conflicts between user groups as they attempt to assert their preferred uses of the property. We conducted a research project to find out if these characteristics describe the state-owned Jocassee Gorges.

Evidence of Use and Abuse

Our first goal was to quantify the use of the Jocassee Gorges under state ownership to determine if usage increased and to identify whether abuse (harmful use) also went up. Such quantification posed a challenge. Measuring use of a state-owned resource can be problematic precisely because of its publicness. The management plan for the Jocassee Gorges calls for openness for all users and no fees. Because no entrance fee is required, and the property does not have gates of entry, accurately counting users is impossible.⁸ So, to assess use, we employed two strategies: first, we interviewed people knowledgeable about the property; and second, we obtained data from the DNR on the number of tickets written to individuals violating the rules and regulations governing the property.

Evidence from Interviews

Our first strategy confirms our expectations. A DNR officer responsible for an area that includes the western portion of the property says that the human impact since the state's takeover has been great, with more hunters, hikers, off-road vehicle (ORV) riders, and kayakers, among others, using the resource.⁹ A DNR biologist corroborates this assessment, saying that an excessive number of people is the biggest threat to the property. "The state of South Carolina owns it, and we got to do something for everyone," he explains.¹⁰

Focusing on hunting, the past president of the South Carolina Sportsman's Coalition says that pressure on the property has "quadrupled," with an increase in bear hunters specifically from 200-400 per season to 900-1,000 per season.¹¹ The biologist adds that users are not limited to citizens of South Carolina. With the Internet helping to spread the word, people from North Carolina, Georgia, and Tennessee who seek outdoor recreation are also coming to the area.¹² To manage the property, DNR now tries to have an officer on patrol everyday, whereas

before state ownership, officers generally patrolled only on weekends.¹³ As another spokesman for DNR said, “We don’t have a problem managing wildlife and resources. Our problem is managing people.”¹⁴


Evidence from Data on Violations

Our second strategy to determine changes in use (and abuse) of the property is to examine data on tickets written for violations of rules and regulations governing the property. We obtained copies of tickets written on the property from 1994 to 2000, sorted into three broad categories: alcohol and drug violations, hunting and fishing violations, and Wildlife Management Area violations.¹⁵ This methodology is imprecise as a measure of the intensity with which the property is used. Most users of the property are, one hopes, law-abiding, so violations will not measure changes in legal usage. As a measure of abuse of the property, this methodology also has shortcomings. Because the total number of users is unknown, it is impossible to identify the share of all use represented by the number of violations. In addition, we do not have the requisite data on the number and frequency of patrols to hold constant enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, this methodology serves as a proxy for overall use of the property and is the only means to gauge abuse. The results are presented in Figure 3.

The evidence we do have supports our contention that state ownership leads to greater use and abuse of the property. Though the number of alcohol and drug violations is small, the increase since the state took control of the property in 1997 is significant. Although somewhat fragmented, evidence from hunting and fishing violations lends some support to our position. Four of the twelve violations in 1997 occurred after the state’s purchase of the property.

The most telling evidence comes from data on WMA violations. These are citations for violations of rules that relate to littering, illegal camping, destroying flora, and driving on closed roads—activities that clearly affect environmental quality. Since the state’s purchase of the property, the number of WMA violations has increased dramatically (eight of the 1997 violations occurred after the state’s purchase of the property), though more vigorous enforcement appears to be reversing the trend.¹⁶ Yet, as the DNR biologist acknowledges, only a fraction of violators are caught, as DNR enforcement officers are spread over a large area.¹⁷

Figure 3
Violations of Rules and Regulations Governing Jocassee Gorges, 1994–2000



Source: South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (2000).

In sum, after the state took over, it appears that more visitors at times used the land in ways that threatened its preservation in a “natural” state—the key goal of state management according to the management plan.

Interest Group Conflicts Emerge

Because of the scarcity and value of natural resources, someone must make the critical decisions on how the natural resources will be allocated. When resources are held publicly, state authorities make these decisions subject to interest group pressures and influence. And conflicts among competing interest groups are inevitable. The second part of our project was designed to explore these conflicts.

A Public Debate over Management

Perhaps the first substantial indication of conflicts over use of the Jocassee Gorges come from a January 8, 1998, public meeting. The meeting was called to address how the property would be managed under state ownership. Each of the approximately 800 people attending was asked to assess and, by voting, identify the top five management issues. Participants voted for a total of 89 different (though not necessarily incompatible) issues.

Table 1 lists those issues, along with the number of votes received, for each issue that received at least ten votes. We do not judge the relative merits of these issues but present these data to show that the priorities and preference intensities of the future users of the property vary greatly.

Table 1
Issues and Votes at Jocassee Gorges Public Meeting, January 1998

Issues Voted	Number of Votes Received
Maintain as Status Quo	168
Timber Harvesting (in favor of wildlife and forestry)	164
Reasonable Access	131
User Fees	121
Remain Undeveloped (no state or community development)	116
Multiple-Use Recreation	114
Wilderness	105
Hiking	97
Handicap Access	93
Conservation and Education	82
Camping	81
Preserve Biodiversity	75
Off-Road Vehicle Access	74
Plan Driven by Solid Scientific Data	73
Law Enforcement	71
Timber Harvesting (against)	68
No Off-Road Vehicle Mechanical Vehicle Access	64
Limited Timber Harvesting (select cut)	54
Partnerships	52
Hunting	49
Fishing	48
Road Maintenance	41
Horseback Riding	39
No New Roads	38
Heritage Preserve on Sections of Property	37
Preservation	34
All-Terrain Vehicle Access	34
Best Management Practice for All Uses	29
Mountain Bikes	26
Zoning (management units)	23
Designated Trails	21
Protect Species (plant and animal)	20
Maintain Pure Water Quality	20
Old Growth	18
Limited Preservation	16
Local Input	15
Reintroduce only Native Plants	15
Designated Area for All Motorized Vehicles	14
Whole Property Heritage Preserve	14
Pollution	13
Soil and Water Conservation	13
Hunting and Camping	11
Horseback and Camping	11
Year Round Access	10

Source: Rankin (1998).

Evidently, some want to limit or minimize human impact by maintaining the property in its undeveloped state, as indicated by the 168 votes received by “Maintain as Status Quo.” Others want to expand human access and use by accommodating a variety of recreational activities, from low-impact activities such as hiking (97 votes) to potentially high-impact activities such as riding off-road vehicles (74 votes). In total, DNR received a total of 204 issues raised or comments made through these votes, additional public meetings, letters, and contacts (Rankin 1998, 3). Clearly, the number of competing objectives is large.

Interviews with Interest Group Spokesmen

Although individual opinions, such as those expressed at a public meeting, are important, the most effective way to influence political outcomes is through an interest group. To assess the influences of and conflicts between user groups, we had conversations with representatives of 12 interest groups using the survey form found in the appendix as a basis for those conversations. Among other things, our survey asked each group to identify changes in its own use of the property, changes in the policies and regulations governing the property, and whether the group or its members are satisfied with current management.

Three environmental groups, the South Carolina Sierra Club, South Carolina Forest Watch, and South Carolina Wildlife Federation, are pleased with the state’s purchase of the property. The director of the South Carolina chapter of the Sierra Club commented that the property is more likely to be managed in the public’s interest if it is in the state’s hands, because Duke Energy would have sold the property for resort development.¹⁸ The executive director of the South Carolina Wildlife Federation also seemed generally pleased with state ownership and management of the property and favors legislation giving DNR greater regulatory authority over the property.¹⁹ Similarly, the chair of the Foothills Group of the South Carolina Sierra Club expressed desire for more laws and regulations.²⁰ A bill to expand DNR’s regulatory authority has been introduced in South Carolina’s General Assembly but has not passed.

Despite this general approval of state ownership and management, dissatisfaction was also evident. The chair of the Foothills Group of the South Carolina Sierra Club said that his organization objects to some policies currently in the management plan: road building (favored by hunters and off-road vehicle riders), helicopter pads (justified to aid rescue missions), and failure to take aggressive action to curtail stream deterioration.²¹ The director of the South Carolina Sierra Club added that club members favor use of the property for education, research (for example, on wild plants and animals, especially endangered species), and “passive recreational uses.” All-terrain vehicles (ATVs) and horses should be prohibited, as should timber cutting, according to this official. Current policies allow all these under some circumstances.

Spokespersons for the South Carolina Sierra Club and South Carolina Forest Watch were particularly critical of the helicopter pads. A past president of South Carolina Forest Watch told a South Carolina newspaper that the pads are “ill-placed, too large, poorly engineered and downright ugly.” He added that “despite the area’s legendary diversity, the agency [DNR] did not do on-the-ground plant surveys.” Further, poor construction is contributing to erosion, and the location of two pads within a mile of each other smacks of redundancy rather than serving public safety. Finally, he complained that the pads were constructed without “adequate public notification” (Campbell 2001, A11).

In spite of these dissatisfactions, environmentalists’ faith in the political process runs high. Along with supporting greater regulatory authority and more enforcement resources for DNR, they hope to influence the DNR board to manage the resource more in accordance with their objectives.²² Their most ambitious hope is for the property to be declared part of the state’s Heritage Trust Preserve, a designation that would significantly restrict use of the property.²³

Begun in 1976, the Heritage Trust Preserve is meant to set aside property of unique “natural and cultural diversity” for “the benefit of present and future generations.” The benefit to present and future generations is meant to occur through research, teaching, habitat maintenance, recreation, and promotion of an “understanding and appreciation of the aesthetic, cultural, and scientific values” of these sites.²⁴ Heritage Trust Preserves are distinctive because of their emphasis on maintaining the natural character of a site. For example, exotic plants are not cultivated; hunting, while permitted on large tracts, is not the primary purpose of the property; timber is harvested only for ecological reasons; and use of all-terrain vehicles is limited.²⁵ Whether environmentalists will have their faith rewarded and their hopes realized remains an open question.

Two of the largest user groups of the Jocassee Gorges property are hunters and fishers. If the theories of bureaucratic behavior advanced by Niskanen and Lindsay are correct, we would expect to see the property managed in ways that cater to these users. About 40 percent of the DNR budget comes from hunting and fishing licenses (commercial and recreational), boat registrations, and merchandise sales. Another 41 percent of DNR’s revenues come from the state budget.²⁶ The remainder comes from the federal government through programs that refund federal taxes on hunting and fishing equipment, including excise taxes on “sporting arms and ammunition,” pistols and revolvers, fishing tackle and equipment, motorboat fuel taxes, and imported fishing tackle and boats to states.²⁷ With these revenues based in large part on hunting and fishing-related expenses, the DNR would be expected to favor hunters and fishers over other users. First, as Niskanen suggested, this could increase the discretionary part of the agency’s budget. Second, as Lindsay suggested, producing measurable outputs also favors fishing or hunting. The number of fish caught or big game animals bagged is more measurable than is observation of nature. Of course, groups that are already

tioned to the state by virtue of licensing requirements are more apt to take an interest in supporting the agency's mission.

Dean Lueck's research findings on state wildlife agency budgets support these points (Lueck 2000). Lueck found that more narrowly focused agencies receive larger budgets than agencies with broad missions covering natural resources and wildlife management. Agencies that receive more of their funds from the state general fund, rather than from fees, have larger budgets. He found that fishing activity is a more important determinant of budgets than hunting, which suggests that anglers are better organized politically than hunters.

Thus, perhaps not surprisingly, spokespersons for the South Carolina Sportsman's Coalition, the National Wild Turkey Federation, and Trout Unlimited expressed a high degree of satisfaction with DNR's management.²⁸ The spokesman for the South Carolina Sportsman's Coalition noted that under Duke Energy's ownership, the property had not been managed intensively for game, whereas under state control, the property is being managed expressly for that purpose. A spokesperson for the National Wild Turkey Federation agreed, saying the land should be and is being managed for hunters. Plans to improve roads on the property are incorporated in the management plan (Rankin 1998, 49–52) and are already being undertaken (South Carolina Department of Natural Resources 2000, 2). Road improvements provide greater access for and dispersion of hunters and fishers. Of even greater importance to anglers, these improvements help to prevent erosion that is detrimental to the water quality of trout streams.

Nevertheless, all is not necessarily well from the viewpoint of hunters and trout fishers. Both groups oppose ORVs because of their noise. Trout fishers have an added concern because the dirt that ORVs churn eventually becomes silt in streams.²⁹

Hunters are also wary of environmentalists' efforts to have the property designated as part of the state's Heritage Trust Preserve.³⁰ The past president of the South Carolina Sportsman's Coalition says his organization is adamantly opposed to Heritage Trust designation. With its emphasis on natural, self-regulating ecosystems, species protection, and environmental preservation, Heritage Trust designation would diminish hunters' influence over the property. Though hunting would still be permitted, the timber management necessary for good wildlife habitat would not be. (Prescribed burns, thinning, and cutting are essential if the soft mast on which bear, deer, and turkey feed are to grow.) Furthermore, increased hunting pressure with a lack of timber management can significantly diminish the hunting experience.³¹ The past president also argues that it is unfair to take this property from hunters who, from the beginning, supported the state's purchase.³²

Another frequent user group, hikers, express less approval of DNR management than environmentalists and sportsmen. They have strong reservations about use by other interest groups, and the chairman of the

Foothills Trail Conference especially opposes all-terrain and similar vehicles and horses. He says that both greatly diminish the quality of the hiking experience by damaging trails and, in the case of all-terrain vehicles, by noise that sounds like a “racetrack.”³³

The final user groups surveyed for this study are trail users, including mountain bikers, horseback riders, and ORV riders. These include the Greater Clemson Mountain Bike Club, the South Carolina Horsemen’s Council, Palmetto Trails, and the South Carolina Off-Road Enthusiasts. With the exception of Palmetto Trails, none of these user groups has an interest in hiking, and hiking is only one interest of members of Palmetto Trails. Because other trails are available for them, bikers and horseback riders are not major players in the competition for the Jocassee Gorges. The spokesman for the Greater Clemson Mountain Bike Club said his club members have little interest in the Jocassee Gorges because they have access to trails in the Clemson Forest.³⁴ The spokeswoman for the South Carolina Horsemen’s Council also said that her group uses the Jocassee Gorges property very little, but she noted potential conflicts with all-terrain vehicle riders because their noise could scare a horse and, in the worst case, throw the rider.³⁵

The director of Palmetto Trails expressed general dissatisfaction with the property’s management, arguing for an increase in the quantity and quality of trails to serve all users. He complained that DNR manages the property for the benefit of hunters and fishers who often oppose other uses of the property and overstate the problems with trash and noise that are associated with well-managed trails.³⁶

Clearly, the most controversial and disparaged user group is riders of off-road vehicles. Their use of the Jocassee Gorges property has escalated since the state purchased it. Negative publicity, especially about tickets written for riding on closed roads, has exacerbated the antipathy that other users already felt for this group. They are blamed for silted trout streams, trampled plants (e.g., the much celebrated shrub mountain laurel), and for leaving behind broken tailpipes. One DNR officer quipped, “We have bought a \$25 million four-wheel track. That’s what it has boiled down to.”³⁷

While prohibitions against abusive riding are understandable, the openness of public property makes banning these users politically difficult. As the president of South Carolina Off-Road Enthusiasts (SCORE) says, “We’re no different from any other user group out there.”³⁸ In our interview with the president of SCORE, he noted that South Carolina has only 106 miles of public ORV trails compared with a million acres of state-managed hunting land. He argues that if hikers have trails, so should all-terrain vehicle riders, and that multiple recreational uses can coexist. And he certainly objects to the fact that SCORE’s rights to resource use are not recognized by other users and objects to efforts by the Sierra Club to ban ORVs. He believes that with proper trail

design, layout, and maintenance, the impact from ORVs can be minimized. But, he concludes, the attitude of most groups is “user exclusive.” The “will of shared use” simply isn’t there.³⁹ Be that as it may, public property will be shared, though the relations among those sharing it may not be harmonious.

Overview of the Transition

Recent decades have witnessed a worldwide trend toward the privatization of state assets, but for natural and environmental resources the trend has run in the opposite direction. Their ownership and management are increasingly entrusted to the state. This case study has looked at how the public responds to state ownership and management and how interest groups influence state planning and resource allocation.

When we consider our findings in terms of Figure 1 and the property rights stations, it is as if another arrow has been generated in the figure, one that connects regulatory and public property to the commons. By expanding the number of voices in the determination of resource use, the state blunts the incentive effects of property rights. With sufficient expansion and then competition among interest groups, public ownership begins to generate a tragedy of the commons. As in a commons, individuals and groups, pursuing their self-interest, compete for access and control. The result is overuse and abuse.

Our findings show that the state acquisition of 33,000 acres of relatively undeveloped land changed the public’s perception of the property. One result was a significant increase in the use, and in many cases abuse, of the property. Because state-owned resources belong to all, everyone feels entitled to use them, and few people take responsibility for the impact of their use. Our findings also show a number of interest group conflicts among users. These include environmentalists wanting to preserve the property by minimizing human impact, hunters seeking more intensive game management and improved roads, ORV riders wanting more trails, and others.

As in any political process (where user fees do not channel usage), the ultimate allocation of this resource will depend in large part upon the pressure brought to bear by user groups on state managers and the managers’ response. So, while the state’s purchase of the Jocassee Gorges has prevented development of one kind (private resort development, primarily), greater public use along with interest group pressures suggest that it will not remain pristine. Questions remain about the long-run condition and use of the property and who will benefit most from the amenities it offers.

Better Management for the Jocassee Gorges?

How might some of these problems have been avoided? And could they be avoided now? In this final section, we address possible alternatives for managing Jocassee Gorges by the state of South Carolina in ways that might be wealth-enhancing instead of wealth-destroying. To put it another way, we explore what institutional framework would guard against overuse and interest-group conflicts in favor of resource preservation and use by those who value the property most highly.

An institutional framework that achieves these objectives would require managers of the Jocassee Gorges property to behave with owner-like concern and to face a budget constraint in doing so. Their operating costs would be constrained by revenues obtained from users and others who might voluntarily contribute to the operation. (Capital improvements would be funded by the state.) To achieve this owner-like concern, the proprietors of the resource must have (1) a well-specified objective, (2) the authority to transfer rights to users who value them most, (3) the authority to charge and keep fees to maintain the resource in accordance with their objective, and (4) a long time horizon. These conditions are similar to those found in the French and German river basin management systems, which also operate and maintain recreational areas along the rivers. (Bower et al. 1981). In both those cases, the operating commissions and agencies are designated by the state but receive no funds from the national government; their broad objective is clearly stated and they are monitored by the national government. All users of rivers pay, whether for withdrawal of water, discharge, or for recreational purposes.

We now briefly consider how a Jocassee Gorges board of trustees, established by the state, might manage this special piece of public property. The board's membership would be composed of representatives from each of the major user groups having an interest in the asset along with at-large members, who would form a majority. Life trustees would be designated from the at-large members. Terms of office would be staggered for other trustees.

We begin with a board that uses an auction for allocating access to the property. After this, we offer other options that would apply market discipline to management. In all cases, we assume that the board has been given a clear objective, one that allows for specified multiple activities and does not necessarily indicate which is to be the dominant one. These activities could include recreation, preservation, fishing, hunting, hiking and other pursuits.

An Auction Approach

Under an auction approach, the board's first task would involve determining rates of participation and/or designated locations for different activities. These

could be the number of days that fishing would be allowed and number of hikers that would be accepted. These rates and locations would extend for a specific period of time, say two years. In all cases, participation levels would be constrained by the need to protect the ecological value of the asset. With participation determined, the board would take the next step, an auction of rights to use the property with these constraints.

Starting with a baseline of zero use, the board could auction off use rights to individuals and groups. By purchasing these rights, the groups would be allowed to engage in the activities allowed by those rights. The rights could be geographically specific within the Gorges, as with ORV and hunting rights, or they could apply generally to the whole property. Although users could purchase and use these rights, they could also purchase them and retire them. Thus, hikers who preferred an area where ORV rights existed could buy the rights and retire them. On the other hand, ORV users might bid a higher price for those rights; if so, ORV use would be allowed.

Once allocated, the rights would be transferable. People desiring less hunting or ORV action could purchase the rights from the rightholder, and vice versa. Allocating access through rights would not necessarily eliminate the use of fees, which would be known in advance. A person holding an ORV right would still be charged for entering the area and for use of certain costly areas or facilities. The board's operating budget would be constrained by revenues from the auction and fees. The budget would be supplemented by state appropriations for major capital improvements, where necessary.

The scheme we propose here would be similar to those that have been suggested for allocating grazing rights or rights to in-stream flows of water where any group of demanders could participate in the auction market. The timber industry could also be given the right to bid for designated areas, with appropriate environmental restrictions placed on harvesting. Revenue from timber sales could be a significant source of operating funds for the Jocassee Gorges board (Anderson and Fretwell 1999). Our proposal contains each of the important management characteristics we offered earlier. By adopting this proposal, or something similar to it, owner-like concern would be induced in the management of the Jocassee Gorges.

Contracting Out

Two alternatives would also be superior to the current management plan. They differ largely in the degree to which they comply with the auction approach. The first, contracting out, comes closer to the auction approach.

The operation and maintenance of the Jocassee Gorges could be contracted out to private parties (e.g., environmental organizations or hunters) who would bid for contracts that extended far enough to allow time for establishing

management control—say, five years. The highest positive or lowest negative bidder (it is possible that bidders would require payment to operate and maintain the property) would receive the contract. Limits on the use and protection of the asset would be specified in the contract and well publicized, and a committee of the board of trustees would be named to oversee the operation and monitor contractor performance. However, the winning bidder would have authority to transfer some or all of the rights to the property to other users willing to pay for those rights. The initial environmental constraints would follow the transfer of rights.

To ensure a long time horizon, these trustees, upon a satisfactory annual review of the managing party's operation and performance, would extend the contract each year. Unlike the first proposal, which relies on an auction to determine the activities allowed on the property, this one draws on the knowledge of board members to make that determination. Greater certainty of outcome is known in advance. Certainty is gained but satisfying the preferences of all users may be compromised.

No Appropriations

The Jocassee Gorges property could be managed just as it is now, but with no appropriations for operations or management. The agency with management responsibility would be free to charge entry and activity fees (and even take other actions, such as contracting for timber cutting, within restraints). Net revenues could be retained by the agency for enhancements to the property or, perhaps, earmarked for some popular public cause, such as improvement of the state's kindergartens. Multiple uses would co-exist, but the biggest users would also be the biggest payers. As the demand changes for specific uses, so would the allocation of the resource.

These proposed alternatives to traditional management by a state agency contain incentives that foster asset protection. They appropriately recognize the intensity of demand felt by different user groups and constrain the range of activities engaged in by the managing entity. Monitoring is provided by incentive and competition. The use of the property would reflect the highest valuation by users, and investments with long-term payoffs are encouraged by the structure of the managing unit and by incentives contained in the arrangement. Simply put, these alternatives carry us some distance towards internalizing private-owner incentives in a public sector enterprise.

Conclusion

Our proposals are supported by meaningful precedents. Many state parks nationwide are coping with reduced appropriations through the use of new or higher fees for entrance and by offering a variety of new and innovative recreational services.⁴⁰ Similarly, through the Fee Demonstration Program, the National Park Service and other federal land management agencies are using additional and higher fees to improve facilities (many of which are in disrepair) and to disperse visitors across area and time to reduce congestion and protect resources. We note, too, that user fees may be well received by the public. Most visitors surveyed by the four land management agencies operating the Fee Demonstration Program supported fees (Fretwell 1999b, 11). As Table 1 (see pg. 13) indicated, the support for user fees in the Jocassee Gorges is strong. This option garnered 121 votes, the fourth highest total of any concern expressed.

Nevertheless, after having considered the risky transition of the Jocassee Gorges from private to public hands, we doubt that any of our management suggestions will be considered for adoption. Instead, we forecast an institutional equilibrium that reflects a balancing of special interest pressures by busy state legislators. The result, we predict, is that the asset will be used more intensely and with less quality control. The resource will deteriorate, though not enough to raise the wrath of any one interest group. Like Yellowstone National Park, the nation's oldest and most treasured natural resource asset, the Jocassee Gorges will become run down at the edges. It will never be as pristine and biologically interesting as it was on the day it became public property.

Notes

1. For details, see Anderson and Leal (2001, 48–51) and Stroup and Shaw (1993); also, see Leal (1995). For an extensive discussion and documentation of outcomes, see Fretwell (1999a, 2001) and Nelson (2000). Nelson provides extensive data and analysis and offers an explanation as to why the U.S. Forest Service is unable to provide forest-enhancing management.

2. As Pigou (1932), Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976) and a series of later analysts (McCormick and Tollison 1981) have taught us, because of the typical incentives they face, government agencies will not always be motivated to serve the public interest. Nor will private firms necessarily find stewardship and conservation to be to their advantage. Yet it is possible to structure the rights redefinition in wealth-preserving ways, though this can be difficult to accomplish in the political sector.

3. The names of other locales are also of Cherokee origin: Keowee means “the place of the mulberry,” Oconee means the “watery eyes of the hills,” and

Eastatoe means “the green birds.” Keowee town (now flooded by Lake Keowee) was the center or capital of the lower Cherokee towns.

4. WMA lands are private and U.S. Forest Service lands leased by the state for the purpose of public hunting, with funding from the sale of hunting permits. South Carolina DNR officers have authority to enforce state regulations on these lands.

5. North Carolina purchased 9,760 acres appraised at \$21.5 million through a similar combination of state funds, an anonymous gift, and a Crescent Resources gift. Although North Carolina’s management of its portion of the Gorges is an interesting story in its own right, our discussion is limited to South Carolina’s purchase and experience.

6. To fund the program, the state requires hunters and fishers to purchase WMA permits, which grant access to all WMA lands for \$30.50 per year. The funds from the sale of WMA permits must go to the management and procurement of WMA lands. The state currently pays \$4.56 per acre to private sources and \$0.21 per acre to government sources (data from written correspondence from Jessica Clements, secretary, South Carolina DNR, Columbia, dated October 2, 2001). At the time Duke power owned the property, the state paid \$2.62 per acre to private sources and \$0.41 to government sources (South Carolina Department of Natural Resources 1997).

7. See “Off-road Land Use Concerns Officials,” *Post and Courier*, April 18, 1999, p. B3.

8. The Resource Management Plan for the Jocassee Gorges mentions the possibility of user fees, but states that “(c)urrent regulations restrict SCDNR [the Department of Natural Resources] from assessing user fees” (Rankin 1998, 77). Legislation to repeal this restriction is under consideration, but even if the regulatory restriction is lifted, making fees technically feasible, implementation may be infeasible for political reasons.

9. Personal interview with Sgt. Larry Holbrook, Supervisor, Law Enforcement Division, South Carolina DNR, Pendleton, May 1, 2001.

10. Personal interview with Sam Stokes, senior game biologist, South Carolina DNR, Pendleton, May 1, 2001.

11. Dennis Chastain, past president, South Carolina Sportsman’s Coalition, Pickens, telephone interview, February, 2001.

12. Stokes interview, May 1, 2001.

13. Holbrook interview, May 1, 2001.

14. See “Sierra Club Wants Better Protection of Jocassee,” *Post and Courier*, August 10, 1999, B3.

15. Alcohol and drug violations include underage drinking and possession of marijuana; hunting and fishing violations include hunting or fishing without a license, hunting out of season, hunting over bait, hunting deer at night, and keeping fish under a size limit; WMA violations include driving on closed roads, littering, illegal camping, various weapons violations, and illegally harvesting plants (e.g., mountain laurel).

16. Information comes from “Surveillance and Citations Curb Destruction in Jocassee Gorges,” Associated Press State and Local Wire Service, October 22, 1999; and “State Steps Up Patrols at Jocassee Gorges,” Associated Press State and Local Wire Service, December 21, 1999.

17. Sergeant Holbrook noted that the ten officers responsible for Oconee and Pickens counties have many responsibilities beyond policing the relatively small Jocassee Gorges area.

18. Dell Isham, director, South Carolina Sierra Club, Columbia, telephone interview, February 12, 2001.

19. Angela Viney, executive director, South Carolina Wildlife Federation, Columbia, telephone interview, February 7, 2001.

20. Dennis Cunningham, chair, South Carolina Sierra Club Foothills Group, Seneca, telephone interview, February 13, 2001.

21. Cunningham interview, February 13, 2001.

22. Cunningham interview, February 13, 2001.

23. “Protection Sought for Gorges,” *Greenville (SC) News*, August 18, 2001, p. B1.

24. See South Carolina Statute 51-17-30, “Purpose of Heritage Trust Program.”

25. Kathy McDeed, executive director, South Carolina Forest Watch, Westminster, email correspondence, September 14, 2001. In addition, the South Carolina Sierra Club director notes that Heritage Trust status is a statutory creation and hence regulations governing it are legally enforceable. In contrast, the management plan is a “vague list of options” that are not enforceable (Isham interview, September 14, 2001).

26. Information provided by Dan Dobbins, assistant to director, South Carolina Department of Natural Resources, Columbia, written correspondence, February 27, 2001.

27. These revenues come from the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act (Pittman-Robertson Act), the Federal Aid in Sport Fish Restoration Act (Dingle-Johnson Act), their subsequent amendments (particularly the Wallop-Breaux Amendment), as well as DNR contracts with the National Marine Fisheries Agency. See www.restorewildlife.org for histories and copies of these statutes.

28. Chastain interview, February 2001; Robert Abernathy, director of agency programs, National Wild Turkey Federation, Edgefield, SC, telephone interview, March 2001; Thomas McInnis, president, Trout Unlimited Chattooga River 556, Clemson, SC, telephone interview, February 7, 2001.

29. Roads are being improved with large stones instead of gravel. The large stones provide greater road stability, but also discourage ORV riders (Holbrook interview, May 1, 2001).

30. See “Protection Sought for Gorges,” *Greenville News*, August 18, 2001, p. B1.

31. We note that timber management is not necessarily “unnatural,” given that the natural fires that would achieve the same end are suppressed by human

intervention.

32. Chastain interview, September 2001.

33. Hayward Douglas, chairman, Foothills Trail Conference, Greenville, telephone interview, February 20, 2001.

34. Scott Snape, spokesperson, Greater Clemson Mountain Bike Club, Clemson, telephone interview, February 20, 2001.

35. Julie Sessions, spokesperson, South Carolina Horsemen's Council, Columbia, telephone interview, February 21, 2001.

36. Tom Chinn, trail director, Palmetto Trails, Columbia, telephone interview, February 7, 2001.

37. See "Off-road Land Use Concerns Officials," *Post and Courier* (Charleston, SC), April 18, 1999, p. B3; as well as "Sierra Club wants better protection of Jocassee," *Post and Courier*, August 10, 1999, p. B3; "State Agency Working at Jocassee Gorges," Associated Press State and Local Wire, October 14, 1999; "Surveillance and Citations Curb Destruction in Jocassee Gorges," Associated Press State and Local Wire, October 22, 1999; and "State Steps Up Patrols at Jocassee Gorges," Associated Press State and Local Wire, December 21, 1999.

38. "Off-road Land Use Concerns Officials," *Post and Courier*, April 18, 1999, p. B3.

39. Jimmy Parrish, president, South Carolina Off-Road Enthusiasts, Columbia, SC, telephone interview, February 7, 2001.

40. Texas state parks have been particularly innovative. Along with restructuring and increasing traditional fees for entrance, picnicking, and camping, Texas parks have introduced a host of new services, such as owl prowls, 'gator gazing, cattle drives, desert survival courses, and wildlife safaris, all for a fee. See Leal and Fretwell (1997).

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Appendix

List of Interest Groups Surveyed

Foothills Trail Conference
Greater Clemson Mountain Bike Club
National Wild Turkey Federation
Palmetto Trails/Palmetto Conservation Fund
Sierra Club—Foothills Group
Sierra Club—South Carolina Chapter
South Carolina Forest Watch
South Carolina Horseman's Council
South Carolina Off-Road Enthusiasts
South Carolina Sportsman's Coalition
South Carolina Wildlife Federation
Trout Unlimited

Survey Questions

1. Did you or members of your group use the area before the 1997 ownership change? After the ownership change?
2. Have you noticed any changes in the use policies or regulations governing the Jocassee Gorges property? If so, do you see these changes as positive or negative?
3. Are you or members of your group satisfied with the current land management of the Jocassee Gorges property?
4. What changes does your group recommend? Is your group currently lobbying for these changes?
5. Do you know of other organizations lobbying for policy changes or impacted by the ownership changes?
6. Does your organization have a position statement on the use and policies governing the Jocassee Gorges property?